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PATENTING HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM 
CELLS: WHAT IS SO IMMORAL? 
INTRODUCTION 
tem cell research is at the center of an international ethical and po-
litical debate. Stem cells are unspecialized cells, meaning they 
have the potential to develop into multiple types of cells in the body.1 
Because of this unspecialized quality and stem cells’ ability to divide for 
indefinite periods in lab culture,2 a significant portion of the scientific 
community believes that stem cell research is the key to finding new 
treatments for a variety of human diseases, conditions, and injuries.3 But 
stem cells come in different degrees of unspecialization and from a varie-
ty of sources, some of which are objectionable to segments of the popu-
lation. At the forefront of the stem cell debate are human embryonic stem 
cells (“hESCs”),4 whose cultivation typically requires an initial destruc-
tion of a human embryo.5 Yet hESCs are the least differentiated type of 
stem cell, capable of giving rise to any cell type in the human body. 
Therefore, hESC research, according to many, is far more likely to lead 
to life-saving treatments than the research of any other stem cell type.6 
The hESC controversy draws lines through the population similar, but 
not identical, to those in the abortion rights battle. Opponents of abortion 
rights commonly assert that a human fetus7 has the right to life. Although 
hESC research, in its current state, also involves the destruction of poten-
tial human life, it does so at a far earlier stage in human development: to 
                                                                                                             
 1. See NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., STEM CELL 
BASICS (2009), available at http://stemcells.nih.gov/staticresources/info/basics/SCprimer 
2009.pdf [hereinafter STEM CELL BASICS]. 
 2. See id. at 1, 22. 
 3. See id. at 13. 
 4. Researchers Matthew Kaufman and Martin Evans are credited with deriving the 
first stem cells, from mice, in 1981; it was more than a decade later when the first hESCs 
were derived. See NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., STEM 
CELLS: SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS, at ES-3, 11–12, 30 
(2001), available at http://stemcells.nih.gov/staticresources/info/scireport/PDFs/fullrpt 
stem.pdf. 
 5. See H.W. Denker, Potentiality of Embryonic Stem Cells: An Ethical Problem 
Even with Alternative Stem Cell Sources, 32 J. MED. ETHICS 665 (2006). 
 6. See Gautam Naik, Stem-Cell Advance May Skirt Ethical Debate: Scientists Return 
Adult Cells Back to Embryonic State: ‘We’ll All Get More Money,’ WALL ST. J., June 7, 
2007, at B1. 
 7. The embryo typically develops into the fetus at about eight weeks after fertiliza-
tion. See STEM CELL BASICS, supra note 1, at 19. 
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develop hESC lines,8 researchers typically harvest the human blastocyst, 
a preimplantation9 embryo consisting of about 150 cells and comprised 
of an outer layer of cells, a fluid-filled cavity, and an inner cell mass.10 
The human blastocyst is essentially a hollow ball, smaller than a pinhead, 
completely lacking in any features recognizable as human.11 Because 
occasionally a blastocyst may be fatally flawed, the probability of a blas-
tocyst developing to the stage of viability is significantly lower than that 
of a fetus developing to a viable baby.12 While the line between “fetus” 
and “child” is hazy, the line between “blastocyst” and “child” is even 
less clear. Supporters of embryonic stem cell (“ESC”) research have a 
mission quite different from that of abortion rights activists. Human ESC 
research is performed for the purpose of improving or saving the lives of 
the now-living and yet-to-be-born. This goal is entirely unrelated to 
whether a woman has a constitutional right to choose whether to carry 
out her pregnancy.13 
                                                                                                             
 8. An embryonic stem cell line is defined as “embryonic stem cells, which have 
been cultured under in vitro conditions that allow proliferation without differentiation for 
months to years.” Id. 
 9. Preimplantion means before the embryo has attached itself to the uterine wall. Id. 
at 22. 
 10. The blastocyst is one of the earliest stages of human development, forming 
around a week after fertilization. The outer layer of cells is known as the trophoblast, 
which gives rise to the placenta and other supporting tissues. The fluid-filled cavity is 
known as the blastocoel. The inner cell mass eventually develops into the fetus. See NIH, 
MedlinePlus Medical Encyclopedia: Fetal Development, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medline 
plus/ency/article/002398.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2009); STEM CELL BASICS, supra note 
1, at 18–23. For more information and high quality photos of early stages of human de-
velopment, see Advanced Fertility Center of Chicago, IVF Blastocyst Pictures & Blastocyst 
Stage Embryo Grading Photos & Images, http://www.advancedfertility.com/blastocyst 
images.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2009). 
 11. See Australian Stem Cell Centre, Fact Sheet 6: Ethics of Stem Cell Research, 
http://stemcellcentre.edu.au/media-centre_resource-library.aspx (last visited Mar. 4, 2009). 
 12. Theoretically, any healthy human embryo has the potential to develop into a hu-
man child if implanted properly. Still, a significant percentage of human sex cells contain 
genetic or chromosomal abnormalities that may prevent an embryo from developing 
properly. See David K. Gardner & William B. Schoolcraft, Controversies in Assisted 
Reproductions and Genetics, 15 J. ASSISTED REPRODUCTION & GENETICS 455, 455 (1998); 
Naik, supra note 6. About fifteen to twenty percent of pregnancies end in miscarriage; 
more than eighty percent of miscarriages occur during the first trimester. See BabyCenter, 
Understanding Miscarriage, http://www.babycenter.com/0_understanding-miscarriage_ 
252.bc (last visited Mar. 4, 2009). 
 13. Because of these disparities, some pro-lifers support hESC research, despite the 
prerequisite destruction of a human embryo. See, e.g., Michael D. Shear, Conservatives 
Ready to Battle McCain on Convention Platform, WASH. POST, July 7, 2008, at A1; Jeff 
Zeleny, House Votes to Expand Stem Cell Research, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2007, at A24. 
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Because of the clinical promise of hESCs, hESC-based inventions con-
stitute valuable intellectual property.14 While the humanistic benefits are 
what make embryonic stem cells research so appealing to scientists, it is 
the patent system that provides the true incentives for the pharmaceuti-
cals industry and universities to invest in research that guarantees a rea-
sonable opportunity for economic gain.15 
The Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (“WARF”) owns three 
U.S. patents relating to the first ESC lines derived from human blasto-
cysts.16 The first of these patents issued on December 1, 1998, as U.S. 
Patent No. 5,843,780 (“‘780 patent”). WARF has licensed its patent 
rights to Geron Corporation,17 which holds the exclusive rights to develop 
any of the five hESC lines claimed in WARF’s patents.18 
WARF also filed a European patent application19 that was nearly iden-
tical in content to the ‘780 patent. Despite this near identity, the Euro-
pean application faced quite different obstacles before the European Pa-
tent Office (“EPO”), which is bound by the laws of the European Patent 
                                                                                                             
 14. As of 2002, there were over 2,000 patent applications involving stem cells of any 
origin, a quarter of which were directed to ESCs. Over a third of the general stem cell 
applications and a quarter of all embryonic stem cell applications were granted. EURO-
PEAN GROUP ON ETHICS IN SCI. & NEW TECH. TO THE EUROPEAN COMM’N, ETHICAL 
ASPECTS OF PATENTING INVENTIONS INVOLVING HUMAN STEM CELLS 10 (May 7, 2002), 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/european_group_ethics/docs/avis16_en.pdf [hereinafter 
EGE OPINION]. 
 15. See James C. De Vellis, Patenting Industry Standards: Balancing the Rights of 
Patent Holders with the Need for Industry-wide Standards, 31 AIPLA Q. J. 301, 310 
(2003). 
 16. Dr. James A. Thomson invented the first embryonic stem cell lines derived from 
human blasocysts. See James A. Thomson et al., Embryonic Stem Cell Lines Derived 
from Human Blastocysts, 282 SCIENCE 1145 (1998). The U.S. Patent and Trademark Of-
fice granted three patents for Dr. Thomson’s inventions. Dr. Thomson in turn assigned 
these three U.S. patents to WARF. The three Thomson U.S. patents are as follows: U.S. 
Patent No. 5,843,780 (issued Dec. 1, 1998); U.S. Patent No. 6,200,806 (issued Mar. 13, 
2001); and U.S. Patent No. 7,029,913 (issued Apr. 18, 2006). 
 17. See News Release, Geron Corp., Geron Supports WARF’s Claims to Human 
Embryonic Stem Cell Patents, Apr. 2, 2007, http://www.geron.com/media/pressview.aspx? 
id=795. 
 18. See Andrew Pollack, ‘Politically Correct’ Stem Cell Is Licensed to Biotech Con-
cern, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2002, at C8; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, U.S. Concedes Some Cell 
Lines Are Not Ready, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 6, 2001, at A1. 
 19. WARF’s European patent application, European Patent Application No. 96903521.1, 
was a regional stage entry of PCT International Application No. PCT/US96/00596 (filed 
Jan. 19, 1996), which claimed priority and was a continuation-in-part of U.S. Patent Ap-
plication Serial No. 08/376,327 (filed Jan. 20, 1995). 
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Convention (“EPC”).20 While the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
(“USPTO”) granted the ‘780 patent relatively quickly,21 the EPO outright 
refused to examine the European application on the ground that the in-
vention was “contrary to morality.”22 After years of appeals, the En-
larged Board of Appeal (“Enlarged Board”)—the highest level of legal 
authority in the EPO, responsible for resolving the most important issues 
of European patent law—ruled on November 25, 2008, that European 
patent law banned the patenting of ESC inventions whose preparation 
necessarily involved the destruction of human embryos.23 
This disparity in treatment underscores a significant divergence be-
tween the U.S. and European patent systems.24 Unlike the USPTO,25 the 
                                                                                                             
 20. In this Note, “EPO” refers to the European Patent Office, not the European Patent 
Organization. The EPO is an organ of the legal entity, the European Patent Organization. 
The EPO was established under Chapter III of the EPC. Convention on the Grant of Eu-
ropean Patents (European Patent Convention), Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 254 [herei-
nafter EPC 1973]. A revised version of the EPC 1973 went into force on December 13, 
2007. Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Convention) as 
revised by the Act revising Article 63 EPC of 17 December 1991 and the Act revising the 
EPC of 29 November 2000, available at http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/epo 
net.nsf/0/E4F8409B2A99862FC125736B00374CEC/$File/EPC_13th_edition.pdf [herei-
nafter EPC 2000]. See also Stacey J. Farmer & Martin Grund, Revision of the European 
Patent Convention and Potential Impact on European Patent Practice, 36 AIPLA Q.J. 
419 (2008). 
 21. The ‘780 patent was issued on December 1, 1998; its application was filed on 
January 18, 1996. Unhappy with Geron’s licensing fees, two consumer groups fought 
back by filing petitions for reexamination of WARF’s patents, asserting that WARF’s 
claims were obvious in light of previous stem cell research. The USPTO granted the peti-
tion and preliminarily invalidated the claims of the three WARF patents. WARF appealed 
and won with respect to all three patents. See Andrew Pollack, 3 Patents on Stem Cells Are 
Revoked in Initial Review, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2007, at C2; Grady Frenchick, WARF Is 
Likely to Hold on to Stem Cell Patent Right, WIS. TECH. NETWORK, Apr. 12, 2007, http://wis 
technology.com/article.php?id=3844; Press Release, WARF, Patent Office Upholds Re-
maining WARF Stem Cell Patents, Mar. 11, 2008, http://www.warf.org/uploads/media/ 
Patent_Office_Upholds_Remaining_WARF_SC_Patents_03-11-08.pdf. 
 22. See Case T-1374/04, [2007] E.P.O. O.J. 313 (Technical Bd. App. 2006). 
 23. Case G-2/06, unpublished op. at 27–28 (Enlarged Bd. App. Nov. 25, 2008), 
available at http://legal.european-patent-office.org/dg3/pdf/g060002ex1.pdf. See also Press 
Release, EPO, No European Patent for WARF/Thomson Stem Cell Application, Nov. 27, 
2008, http://www.epo.org/about-us/press/releases/archive/2008/20081127.html. 
 24. For an overview of the main differences between U.S. and European patentability 
requirements, see Samantha A. Jameson, A Comparison of the Patentability and Patent 
Scope of Biotechnological Inventions in the United States and the European Union, 35 
AIPLA Q.J. 193 (2007). 
 25. See Ex parte Murphy, 200 U.S.P.Q. 801 (Pat. & Trademark Off. Bd. App. 1977) 
(“Just as the court in In re Watson and in In re Anthony made clear that the Patent and 
Trademark Office is not the governmental agency charged with the responsibility for 
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EPO is bound by morality provisions. Specifically, Article 53(a) of the 
EPC prohibits granting a patent for an invention “the commercial exploi-
tation of which would be contrary to ‘ordre public’ or morality.”26 In ad-
dition, Rule 28(c) of the EPC27 explicitly prohibits patenting inventions 
concerning “uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial pur-
poses.”28 
While the Enlarged Board’s decision is legally sound, it is disturbing 
that a question of morality—a factor generally unrelated to the classic 
patentability requirements29—has prevented an invention of proven 
scientific importance and economic value from receiving patent protec-
tion in any European state. While Europe appears more close-knit than 
ever,30 it is still a pluralistic society. Each of the Member States of the 
European Patent Organization31 is its own sovereign State, with its own 
national patent laws and its own understanding of what “morality” 
means.32 While an individual European State may choose to craft its do-
                                                                                                             
determining drug safety, we think this Office should not be the agency which seeks to 
enforce a standard of morality with respect to gambling, by refusing, on the ground of 
lack of patentable utility, to grant a patent on a game of chance if the requirements of the 
Patent Act otherwise have been met.”) (citations omitted). 
 26. EPC 2000, supra note 20, art. 53(a). On December 13, 2007, a revised version of 
the EPC entered into force. The previous 1973 version of the EPC worded Article 53(a) 
slightly differently, prohibiting inventions “the publication or exploitation of which 
would be contrary to ‘ordre public’ or morality.” EPC 1973, supra note 20, art. 53(a). 
(emphasis added). According to the Enlarged Board, “The changes are not relevant to the 
issues considered in this decision.” Case G-2/06, at 2, 27. This Note similarly ignores the 
discrepancy. 
 27. Implementing Regulations to the Convention on the Grant of European Patents, 
Dec. 7, 2006, R. 28, available at http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/ 
0/E4F8409B2A99862FC125736B00374CEC/$File/EPC_13th_edition.pdf [hereinafter 
EPC Regs.]. The provisions of Rule 28 used to be contained in Rule 23d. Implementing 
Regulations to the Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Dec. 13, 2001, R. 23d. 
In the revised version of the EPC, Rule 23d was renumbered as Rule 28. Because this 
change went into effect between the Technical Board of Appeal’s decision in 2006 and 
the Enlarged Board of Appeal’s decision in 2008, the decisions cited in this Note refer to 
these provisions differently. Case G-2/06, at 2. For the ease of the reader, this Note refers 
to these provisions hereinafter only as Rule 28. 
 28. EPC Regs., supra note 27, R. 28(c). 
 29. In other words, some combination of novelty, inventive step, nonobviousness, 
utility, and industrial applicability. 
 30. See Tony Judt, The Nation: Fortunes of War: Europe Finds No Counterweight to 
U.S. Power, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2003, at 41. 
 31. EPO, Member States of the European Patent Organisation, http://www.epo.org/ 
about-us/epo/member-states.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2009). 
 32. See, e.g., Case C-377/98, Kingdom of the Netherlands v. Eur. Parliament & 
Council of the Eur. Union, 2001 E.C.R. I-7079. See generally COMM’N OF THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITIES, COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER: REPORT ON HUMAN EMBRYONIC 
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mestic law to limit the patentability of “immoral” inventions, an outright 
ban by the EPO robs a State of that choice, regardless of whether the in-
vention would be contrary to the morality of that particular State. More-
over, refusing patents in hESC inventions slows the pace of research at a 
time when stem cell technology is still in its infancy and large pharma-
ceutical companies are already somewhat hesitant to invest heavily.33 
Part I of this Note begins with a general overview of stem cells, includ-
ing stem cell science, the current state of stem cell research, and ethical 
concerns facing ESC research. Part II continues with an explanation of 
the morality exception to patentability present in European patent law. 
Part III discusses WARF’s European patent application, including why 
the EPO suspended the examination of the application; the procedural 
history of the case before the Enlarged Board; and the decision of the 
Enlarged Board. Part IV compares the European and U.S. patent systems 
and the ramifications of codifying moral issues into patent law. This 
Note argues that patent offices should not have the authority to make 
morality determinations because a patent office’s expertise is in technol-
ogy and classic issues of patentability, and mixing patent, a classically 
objective area of law, with the predominantly subjective arena of moral 
values undermines the legal certainty of the patent system and its effec-
tiveness in promoting research and investment. This Note concludes by 
offering a few alternatives to the EPO’s current practice of automatically 
refusing morally dubious patent applications that may serve the purposes 
of patent law more effectively. 
I. OVERVIEW OF STEM CELL SCIENCE AND ETHICAL CONCERNS 
Stem cells are unspecialized cells that can differentiate into specialized 
cells upon receiving specific chemical signals.34 Unspecialized cells exist 
at several stages: totipotent stem cells are capable of developing into a 
complete organism; pluripotent stem cells are capable of differentiating 
into any specialized cell type in the body, but are incapable of forming 
the complete organism; and multipotent stem cells are capable of diffe-
rentiating into more than one, but not every, type of specialized cell.35 
                                                                                                             
STEM CELL RESEARCH 43 (2003), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/research/confer 
ences/2003/bioethics/index_en.html [hereinafter CEC REPORT] (comparing the hESC 
research regulations of EU Member States). 
 33. See, e.g., Eric Noe, Stem-Cell Industry, Research Evolving: With Limits on Fed-
eral Funding for Stem Cells, Researchers Look for Private and Business Backing, ABC 
NEWS, Nov. 23, 2004. 
 34. The more unspecialized a stem cell, the greater the number of cell types into 
which it can differentiate. STEM CELL BASICS, supra note 1, at 3–4. 
 35. Id. at 21, 23. 
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Specialized cells, on the other hand, are incapable of differentiating into 
other types of cells and often replicate slowly, if at all.36 Accordingly, 
scientists are trying to manipulate stem cells to regenerate or repair tis-
sues whose specialized cells were damaged, destroyed, or never formed 
in the first place.37 
Stem cells can be found in the body at both adult and embryonic stages 
of life, but in different quantities and qualities.38 The inner cell mass of 
the blastocyst—the early, hollow, spherical stage of the embryo—
consists of ESCs, which ultimately differentiate into the various 200 or 
so specialized cell types in the body as the embryo matures into the fe-
tus.39 Scientists have learned to isolate these pluripotent ESCs and grow 
them in vitro while seemingly retaining the cells’ pluripotency indefinite-
ly.40 
There is a strong movement pushing for continued and increased ESC 
research, with the hope that scientists will develop methods of treating or 
curing a wide variety of genetic disorders, diseases, medical conditions, 
and physical injuries.41 The major aim of ESC research is to perfect a 
method of controlling and precisely directing the differentiation of ESCs 
in order to transplant the healthy differentiated cells into a suffering pa-
tient.42 
But stem cells also exist in adult (i.e., postembryonic) animals; these 
stems cells are referred to as adult stem cells.43 There is plenty of re-
                                                                                                             
 36. Id. at 3–4. 
 37. Id. at 13. 
 38. Id. at 12. 
 39. European Commission, About Stem Cells, http://ec.europa.eu/research/quality-of-
life/stemcells/about.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2009); STEM CELL BASICS, supra note 1, at 
4–5. 
 40. STEM CELL BASICS, supra note 1, at 5–7. 
 41. See Zeleny, supra note 13. But see Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Bush Vetoes Bill Remov-
ing Stem Cell Limits, Saying “All Human Life Is Sacred,” N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2007, at 
A21. 
 42. NIH, Stem Cells and Diseases, http://stemcells.nih.gov/info/health.asp (last vi-
sited Mar. 4, 2009). 
 43. For example, hematopoietic stem cells (adult stem cells) from the bone marrow 
give rise to red blood cells, white blood cells, and platelets. STEM CELL BASICS, supra 
note 1, at 4. Stem cells have also been found in extra-embryonic tissues, such as umbili-
cal cord blood stem cells and amniotic stem cells. See Paolo De Coppi et al., Isolation of 
Amniotic Stem Cell Lines with Potential for Therapy, 25 NATURE BIOTECH. 100 (2007); 
Erica Lloyd, Umbilical Cord Blood: The Future of Stem Cell Research?, NAT’L 
GEOGRAPHIC NEWS, Apr. 6, 2006, available at http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/ 
2006/04/0406_060406_cord_blood.html. In addition, in a well publicized case of fabri-
cated research, Korean scientist Hwang Woo Suk claimed in 2004 to have derived em-
bryonic stem cells from the adult cells of a patient, which could have skirted the ethical 
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search going into adult stem cells, and there are those who believe that 
adult stem cells will provide benefits similar to, or even greater than, 
those of embryonic stem cells.44 However, because adult stem cells are 
generally multipotent, they are incapable of differentiating into as many 
cell types as pluripotent ESCs. Therefore, much of the scientific commu-
nity sees less clinical potential for adult stem cells.45 
In addition, there is ongoing research into other sources of stem cells,46 
especially those sources that do not require the destruction of human 
“life.”47 For example, scientists are attempting to “reprogram” adult stem 
cells back to a less developed, embryonic-like state.48 This would bypass 
the ethical concerns posed by ESCs. Additionally, adult stem cells would 
provide a potential advantage over ESCs in that they would already 
                                                                                                             
issues attached to deriving embryonic stem cells from living embryos. Although Dr. 
Hwang’s research was later discredited, recently Boston scientist concluded that Dr. 
Hwang, without even realizing it, had in fact derived his embryonic stem cells from an 
unfertilized egg through parthenogenesis, a scientific first. See Nicholas Wade, Within 
Discredited Stem Cell Research, A True Scientific First, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2007, at 
A16. 
 44. See Matthew Weed, Discourse on Embryo Science and Human Cloning in the 
United States and Great Britain: 1984–2002, 33 J.L. MED. ETHICS 802, 808 (2005). Still, 
there is some evidence that certain adult stem cell types are pluripotent. Stem cell plastic-
ity is “[t]he ability of stem cells from one adult tissue to generate the differentiated cell 
types of another tissue.” STEM CELL BASICS, supra note 1, at 21. 
 45. See Naik, supra note 6. But see Weed, supra note 44, at 804, 808 (reviewing vari-
ous claims that breakthroughs in adult stem cell technology will eventually make unne-
cessary the ethically undesireable use of hESCs). 
 46. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, A WHITE PAPER: ALTERNATIVE SOURCES 
OF HUMAN PLURIPOTENT STEM CELLS (2005), available at http://bioethics.gov/reports/ 
white_paper/alternative_sources_white_paper.pdf [hereinafter WHITE PAPER] (discussing 
the ethical and scientific soundness of alternative sources of human pluripotent stem 
cells, including pluripotent stem cells derived from “dead” embryos; pluripotent stem 
cells via blastomere extraction from living human embryos, i.e., extracting a few stem 
cells from the preblastocyst embryo while retaining its viability; pluripotent stem cells 
derived from biological artifacts, i.e., artificial, “less than human” embryos similar 
enough to “true” human embryos to derive pluripotent stem cells from them; and pluripo-
tent stem cells derived from somatic cell dedifferentiation, i.e., reprogramming differen-
tiated adult stem cells to restore an undifferentiated pluripotency typical of embryonic 
stem cells). 
 47. See DOMESTIC POL’Y COUNCIL, ADVANCING STEM CELL SCIENCE WITHOUT 
DESTROYING HUMAN LIFE (2007), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives. 
gov/dpc/stemcell/2007/stemcell_040207.pdf. 
 48. See generally WHITE PAPER, supra note 46. 
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match the patient’s genetic makeup and would therefore be less prone to 
rejection by the patient’s immune system.49 
In the early part of this decade, a group of scientists reported the dis-
covery of a type of adult stem cell derived from bone marrow that could 
be reprogrammed to differentiate into any tissue type.50 However, the 
study was eventually discredited when it was discovered that some of the 
group’s findings were falsified.51 Notably, in November 2007, scientists 
reported the discovery of a technique using viruses that converts adult 
skin cells into cells that behave like ESCs, able to replicate indefinitely 
and differentiate into any cell type.52 While the technique potentially 
represents a major breakthrough for nonembryonic stem cells, it also has 
a major deficiency: it can potentially lead to mutations and cancers.53 
Although scientists are searching for techniques that do not use cancer-
causing viruses, an efficient method has not yet been perfected.54 
While ESC research may be more promising than adult stem cell re-
search, ESCs have generated a considerable amount of public dissent due 
                                                                                                             
 49. See, e.g., UCSF Children’s Hospital, Bone Marrow Transplant, http://www.ucsf 
health.org/childrens/medical_services/cancer/bmt/treatments/leukemia.html (last visited Mar. 
4, 2009). 
 50. Yuehua Jiang et al., Abstract, Pluripotency of Mesenchymal Stem Cells Derived 
from Adult Marrow, 418 NATURE 41 (2002), available at http://www.nature.com/nature/ 
journal/v418/n6893/full/nature00870.html. 
 51. Yuehua Jiang et al., Corrigendum: Pluripotency of Mesenchymal Stem Cells Derived 
from Adult Marrow, 447 NATURE 880 (2007). See Peter Aldhous & Eugenie Samuel Reich, 
Stem-Cell Researcher Guilty of Falsifying Data, NEW SCIENTIST, Oct. 7, 2008, http://www. 
newscientist.com/article/dn14886-stemcell-researcher-guilty-of-falsifying-data.html. 
 52. See Andrew Pollack, After Stem-Cell Breakthrough, the Real Work Begins, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 27, 2007, at F1. 
 53. The new technique involves inserting into a patient’s isolated skin cells viruses 
carrying genes that cause the cells to revert to an embryonic-like stage. The modified 
cells would then be administered back to the patient. However, these same viruses can 
incorporate themselves randomly into the patient’s genes, potentially causing mutations 
and cancers. See id. See also Peter Aldhous, Stem Cell Breakthrough May Reduce Cancer 
Risk, NEW SCIENTIST, Feb. 27, 2008, available at http://www.newscientist.com/article/ 
dn13384-stem-cell-breakthrough-may-reduce-cancer-risk.html; Alan I. Leshner & James 
A. Thomson, Standing in the Way of Stem Cell Research, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 2007, at 
A17. 
 54. See Peter Aldhous, Ethical Stem Cells Stripped of ‘Cancer’ Genes, NEW 
SCIENTIST, Mar. 1, 2009, http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn16684-ethical-stem-cells-
stripped-of-cancer-genes.html; Peter Aldhous, Stem Cells Created Without Cancer-
Causing Viruses, NEW SCIENTIST, Sep. 25 2008, available at http://www.newscientist. 
com/article/dn14816-stem-cells-created-without-cancercausing-viruses.html; Rob Stein, 
Scientists Report Advance in Stem Cell Alternative, WASH. POST, Sep. 26, 2008, at A17. 
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to ethical concerns.55 One of the shortcomings of ESC research is the 
difficulty in retaining the viability of the embryo undergoing stem cell 
extraction.56 The process of deriving stem cells from the blastocyst typi-
cally spells death for the embryo. Because any developing human emb-
ryo could ultimately result in the birth of a child, hESC research has 
drawn its major opponents from religious groups, whose ethical convic-
tions against hESC research mirror those held by groups against abor-
tion.57 A similar but separate argument against hESC research is that 
hESC researchers fail to respect human dignity by treating potential hu-
man life like that of a lab rat.58 Still, others fault ESC researchers for 
touting ESCs as an imminent cure for all diseases. Proponents of ESC 
research are accused of setting unrealistic goals and underhandedly rais-
ing the hopes of those in need of life-saving treatment, when potential 
treatments are arguably years, or even decades, away from fruition.59 
There is a precautionary concern with the long-term consequences of 
granting patents directed to hESCs: granting property rights in human 
derivatives would be a slippery slope toward commercialization and 
                                                                                                             
 55. See NIH, Research Ethics and Stem Cells, http://stemcells.nih.gov/info/ethics.asp 
(last visited Mar. 4, 2009). 
 56. While the current general practice for deriving embryonic stem cells entails de-
stroying the embryo, with no attempt to retain viability, recent research suggests that 
embryonic stem cells may be prepared one day without destroying the embryo. See 
Young Chung et al., Human Embryonic Stem Cell Lines Generated Without Embryo De-
struction, 2 CELL STEM CELL 113 (2008); Andy Coghlan, Stem Cell Breakthrough Leaves 
Embryos Unharmed, NEW SCIENTIST, Jan. 10, 2008, available at http://www.newscientist. 
com/article/dn13170-stem-cell-breakthrough-leaves-embryos-unharmed.html. But see Andy 
Coghlan, ‘Hype’ Accusation Blights Stem Cell Breakthrough, NEW SCIENTIST, Aug. 29, 
2006, available at http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn9873-hype-accusation-blights-
stem-cell-breakthrough.html. 
 57. See, e.g., Robert P. George, Our Struggle for the Soul of Our Nation, http://www. 
thepublicdiscourse.com/viewarticle.php?selectedarticle=2009.01.22.001.pdart (last visited 
Mar. 4, 2009); Rebecca Taylor, Abortion, Stem Cells, and Cloning, MARY MEETS DOLLY, 
Oct. 25, 2007, available at http://www.lifeissues.net/writers/tayl/tayl_01abrstemcells 
cloning.html. 
 58. See, e.g., Press Release, Ctr. for Bioethics & Human Dignity, New Embryonic 
Stem Cell Study Smoke and Mirrors Says Bioethicist (Aug. 24, 2006), http://www.cbhd. 
org/media/pr/2006-08-24.htm. See generally Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 
479, 491 (Cal. 1990) (“Nor is it necessary to force the round pegs of ‘privacy’ and ‘digni-
ty’ into the square hole of ‘property’ in order to protect the patient, since the fiduciary-
duty and informed-consent theories protect these interests directly by requiring full dis-
closure.”). 
 59. See Nicholas Wade, Concerns of Dashed Hopes from Promised Miracles, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 12, 2007, at A19. See also Letters to the Editor, No Taxation If There Is Fer-
tilization, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 2006, at A17. 
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moral devaluation of the human body.60 Many believe financial profit 
from the human body or its element is impermissible.61 Some opponents 
of hESC research worry that increased research will lead to a black mar-
ket for human embryos.62 Another fear is the creation of human embryos 
purely for research purposes, which is widely viewed as unethical and is 
outlawed in most countries.63 Still, pursuant to the Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Act (“HFEA”), the United Kingdom permits the crea-
tion of human embryos for research purposes as long as the researcher 
first obtains a license from the relevant government authority.64 
II. EUROPEAN PATENT LAW: THE MORALITY EXCEPTION TO 
PATENTABILITY 
A. Article 27 of TRIPs 
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights65 (“TRIPs”) set forth powerful international standards for intellec-
tual property. Article 27(1) of TRIPs provides that “patents shall be 
                                                                                                             
 60. See CEC REPORT, supra note 32, at 9. Cf. U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECH. 
ASSESSMENT, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY: OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES 
AND CELLS, 33–35, 46 (1987), available at http://www.fas.org/ota/reports/8719.pdf (“The 
ease of application of biotechnology processes has allowed researchers to turn undeve-
loped human tissues and cells into human biological products with significant therapeutic 
promise and commercial potential. Yet the ultimate value of these technologies may not 
be simply their end products; their greater value may be the insights they provide about 
disease processes.”). 
 61. EGE OPINION, supra note 14, at 2. See also CEC REPORT, supra note 32, at 66–69 
(providing examples of national regulatory regimes with varying levels of prohibition on 
embryonic research and commercialization of embryos). See generally Gloria G. Banks, 
Legal and Ethical Safeguards: Protection of Society’s Most Vulnerable Participants in a 
Commercialized Organ Transplantation System, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 45 (2005); Jonathan 
G. Stein, A Call to End Baby Selling: Why the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adop-
tion Should Be Modified to Include the Consent Provisions of the Uniform Adoption Act, 
24 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 39 (2001). 
 62. See, e.g., Daniel McConchie, Using Stem Cells from Embryos Will Make Human 
Flesh Profitable, CTR. FOR BIOETHICS & HUMAN DIGNITY, June 29, 2001, http://www. 
cbhd.org/resources/stemcells/mcconchie_2001-06-29.htm. 
 63. See CEC REPORT, supra note 32, at 9, 66–69; Survey of European Scientists on 
Ethics of Scientific Advancements, GENETIC ENGINEERING & BIOTECH. NEWS, Jun. 15, 
2005, http://www.genengnews.com/articles/chitem.aspx?aid=502&chid=0. 
 64. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (HFEA), 1990, c. 37, §§ 3, 9–15, avail-
able at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/Acts/acts1990/pdf/ukpga_19900037_en.pdf. 
 65. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 
Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter 
TRIPs]. 
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available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields 
of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step[,] 
and are capable of industrial application.”66 But under Article 27(2), 
Member States may enact laws to exclude inventions from patentability 
where necessary to protect ordre public or morality.67 The morality ex-
clusion from patentability is optional. For example, the United States has 
not enacted a statute prohibiting patents directed for “immoral” subject 
matter. Europe, on the other hand, has implemented a morality exclusion 
to patentability in its laws.68 
B. Directive 98/44/EC on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological In-
ventions 
In July 1998, the European Union adopted Directive 98/44/EC (“Direc-
tive”) on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions.69 The pur-
pose of passing the Directive was to harmonize the patent laws of EU 
Member States70 in order to give Europe “a competitive advantage in 
biotechnology innovation.”71 Article 1 of the Directive provides that each 
Member State must protect biotechnogical inventions under its national 
patent laws and in accordance with the Directive, and, if necessary, adjust 
its laws to conform to the Directive.72 The Directive goes on to define 
biotechnological terms, patentable biotech inventions, and patentability 
requirements.73 Article 6(1), however, specifically excludes from paten-
tability inventions whose “commercial exploitation would be contrary to 
ordre public or morality.”74 Subsection (2)(c) further states that “uses of 
                                                                                                             
 66. Id. art. 27(1). 
 67. Id. art. 27(2) (“Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the preven-
tion within their territory of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect 
ordre public or morality, including to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to 
avoid serious prejudice to the environment, provided that such exclusion is not made 
merely because the exploitation is prohibited by their law.”). 
 68. Council Directive 98/44/EC, 1998 O.J. (L 213) 13 [hereinafter Directive]. 
 69. Id. 
 70. The current EU Member States are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slo-
vakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. European Union, Offices, 
http://www.eurunion.org/states/offices.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2009). 
 71. Jasemine Chambers, Patent Eligibility of Biotechnological Inventions in the Unit-
ed States, Europe, and Japan: How Much Patent Policy Is Public Policy?, 34 GEO. 
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 223, 237 (2002). 
 72. Directive, supra note 68, art. 1. 
 73. Id. art. 2, 3. 
 74. Id. art. 6 (italics omitted). 
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human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes” are explicitly 
unpatentable inventions.75 
Article 7 of the Directive provides that the Commission’s European 
Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies (“EGE”) shall eva-
luate all ethical aspects of biotechnology.76 In a May 2002 opinion on the 
ethics of patenting human stem cell inventions, the EGE stated that it 
believed that it was ethically acceptable to permit patenting inventions 
involving the transformation of unmodified hESCs into genetically mod-
ified stem cell lines or specific differentiated stem cell lines for specific 
therapeutic or other uses, provided that the inventions meet the standard 
patentability requirements and would not lead to uses of human embryos 
for industrial or commercial purposes.77 
Although most EU Member States have transposed the Directive into 
their national laws, not all the Member States have done so completely 
voluntarily.78 Notably, the Swedish National Council on Medical Ethics 
(“SMER”)79 strongly opposed the Swedish government making such 
                                                                                                             
 75. Article 6(2) specifically excludes from patentability 
(a) processes for cloning human beings; (b) processes for modifying the germ 
line genetic identity of human beings; (c) uses of human embryos for industrial 
or commercial purposes; [and] (d) processes for modifying the genetic identity 
of animals which are likely to cause them suffering without any substantial 
medical benefit to man or animal, and also animals resulting from such 
processes. 
Id. 
 76. Id. art. 7. 
 77. EGE OPINION, supra note 14, at 16. 
 78. Article 15 of the Directive requires that each of the Member States comply with, 
or adjust its law to comply with, the Directive by July 30, 2000. Directive, supra note 68, 
art. 15. As of June 29, 2005, twenty Member States (Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Malta, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United King-
dom) had complied with Article 15, while the remaining Member States were at various 
stages in the process of transposing the Directive. See Report from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council, the Committee of the Regions and the European Eco-
nomic and Social Committee—Life Sciences and Biotechnology—A Strategy for Eu-
rope—Third Progress Report and Future Orientations, COM(2005) 286 final (June 29, 
2005). Over the last several years, the European Commission has instituted various in-
fringement actions to encourage the noncomplying States to transpose the Directive into 
their national laws. Id. 
 79. “The Swedish National Council on Medical Ethics is an advisory board to the 
Swedish government on ethical issues raised by scientific and technological advances in 
biomedicine.” Swedish National Council on Medical Ethics (SMER), http://www.smer. 
se/Bazment/2.aspx (last visited Mar. 4, 2009). 
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changes to its patent laws.80 The SMER objected to, inter alia, the Direc-
tive’s branding of certain aspects of ESC research as contrary to ordre 
public and morality, even though ESCs constitute a highly progressive 
and promising field of research; the SMER argued that this fact was 
completely unknown at the time the Directive was formulated, but that 
—had it been known—ESC research would not be considered contrary to 
ordre public and morality.81 Yet Sweden yielded to European pressure 
and implemented the Directive into its national laws.82 
In a case decided in 2001 by the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities, the Netherlands, supported by Italy and Norway, sought to 
enjoin implementation of the Directive on six separate grounds.83 One 
such ground was that Article 6 would allow Member States to refuse to 
provide patent protection for a controversial biotechnological invention 
simply by asserting that it was contrary to ordre public or morality.84 Al-
though the court rejected all of the Netherlands’ arguments, the fact that 
the case even exists supports the proposition that the morality provision 
was not universally popular among European States.85 
C. Article 53(a) and Rule 28 of the European Patent Convention 
The European Patent Convention has contained a morality provision in 
Article 53(a) since its inception in 1973.86 Article 53(a)—its language 
mirroring that of Article 6(1) of the Directive—prohibits the granting of 
patents for inventions “the commercial exploitation of which would be 
contrary to ‘ordre public’ or morality.”87 In September 1999, the Euro-
                                                                                                             
 80. SMER, Opinion on Directive 98/44/EC on the Legal Protection of Biotechnical 
Inventions, and Its Implementation in Sweden (Feb. 25, 2002), available at http://www. 
smer.gov.se/english/opinion/patent.eng.htm. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See THE SWEDISH GROUP OF AIPPI, REPORT Q166: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
GENETIC RESOURCES, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND FOLKLORE (July 2006), available at 
http://www.aippi.org/reports/q166/quest06/q166_sweden06.pdf. 
 83. Case C-377/98, Kingdom of the Netherlands v. Eur. Parliament & Council of the 
Eur. Union, 2001 E.C.R. I-7079 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. For a thorough overview of this case, see Juliane Kokott & Thomas Diehn, 
Kingdom of the Netherlands v. European Parliament & Council of the European Union, 
Case C-377/98. 2001 ECR I-7079, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 950 (2002). 
 86. EPC 1973, supra note 20, art. 53(a). 
 87. Article 53 provides in full: 
European patents shall not be granted in respect of: (a) inventions the commer-
cial exploitation of which would be contrary to ‘ordre public’ or morality; such 
exploitation shall not be deemed to be so contrary merely because it is prohi-
bited by law or regulation in some or all of the Contracting States; (b) plant or 
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pean Patent Organization followed in the EU’s footsteps and adopted the 
language of Article 6(2) of the Directive.88 Consequently, Rule 28 of the 
EPC, in providing specific examples of inventions that fit the patentability 
exclusion of Article 53(a), states that “European patents shall not be 
granted in respect of biotechnological inventions which, in particular, 
concern . . . uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial purpos-
es.”89 
III. PATENTING EMBRYONIC STEM CELL LINES IN EUROPE 
A. The WARF Stem Cell Case: EPO’s Refusal of WARF’s European Pa-
tent Application 
WARF’s European patent application contained ten claims.90 Claim 1 
was directed to primate embryonic stem cell cultures.91 Specifically, 
claim 1 provided: 
A cell culture comprising primate embryonic stem cells which (i) are 
capable of proliferation in vitro culture for over one year, (ii) maintain 
a karyotype in which all chromosomes normally characteristic of the 
primate species are present and are not noticeably altered through cul-
ture for over one year, (iii) maintain the potential to differentiate to de-
rivatives of endoderm, mesoderm, and ectoderm tissues throughout the 
culture, and (iv) are prevented from differentiating when cultured on a 
fibroblast feeded layer.92 
                                                                                                             
animal varieties or essentially biological processes for the production of plants 
or animals; this provision shall not apply to microbiological processes or the 
products thereof; (c) methods for treatment of the human or animal body by 
surgery or therapy and diagnostic methods practised on the human or animal 
body; this provision shall not apply to products, in particular substances or 
compositions, for use in any of these methods. 
EPC 2000, supra note 20, art. 53(a). 
 88. Press Release, EPO, The EPO Follows the EU’s Directive on Biotechnology 
Patents, Oct. 27, 2005, available at http://www.epo.org/about-us/press/releases/archive/ 
2005/27102005.html. 
 89. EPC Regs., supra note 27, R. 28. 
 90. As amended by WARF on June 18, 2003. Reply to Examination Report, T.J. 
Duckworth on behalf of WARF (June 18, 2003) (on file with the EPO). See also Case T-
1374/04, [2007] E.P.O. O.J. at 314. 
 91. Reply to Examination Report, supra note 90. See also Case T-1374/04, [2007] 
E.P.O. O.J. at 314. 
 92. Reply to Examination Report, supra note 90, at claim 1 (emphasis omitted). See 
Case T-1374/04, [2007] E.P.O. O.J. at 314. 
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WARF acknowledged that “primate embryonic stem cells,” as recited in 
claim 1, included human embryonic stem cells.93 Claims 2–8 were di-
rected to further embodiments of the cell culture of claim 1.94 Claim 9 
was directed to a method of maintaining such a cell culture, and claim 10 
to a method of obtaining differentiated primate cells from such a cell cul-
ture.95 
The EPO Examining Division refused WARF’s European application 
for the failure of claims 1–7, 9, and 10 to comply with Article 53(a) in 
conjunction with Rule 28(c).96 WARF appealed to the EPO Technical 
Board of Appeal, challenging the Examining Division’s interpretation of 
Article 53(a) and Rule 28(c).97 Because of the potential impact of the 
EPO’s interpretation of the EPC provisions on future patentees and stem 
cell research in general, the Technical Board of Appeal referred the case 
to the Enlarged Board of Appeal posing the following questions: 
1. Does Rule [28](c) EPC apply to an application filed before the entry 
into force of the rule? 
2. If the answer to question 1 is yes, does Rule [28](c) EPC forbid the 
patenting of claims directed to products (here: human embryonic stem 
cell cultures) which—as described in the application—at the filing date 
could be prepared exclusively by a method which necessarily involved 
the destruction of the human embryos from which the said products are 
derived, if the said method is not part of the claims? 
3. If the answer to question 1 or 2 is no, does Article 53(a) EPC forbid 
patenting such claims? 
4. In the context of questions 2 and 3, is it of relevance that after the fil-
ing date the same products could be obtained without having to recur to 
a method necessarily involving the destruction of human embryos 
(here: eg derivation from available human embryonic cell lines)? 98 
                                                                                                             
 93. Case T-1374/04, [2007] E.P.O. O.J. at 328. 
 94. Reply to Examination Report, supra note 90, at claims 2–8. See also Case T-
1374/04, [2007] E.P.O. O.J. at 314. 
 95. Reply to Examination Report, supra note 90, at claims 9–10. See also Case T-
1374/04, [2007] E.P.O. O.J. at 314–15. 
 96. Case T-1374/04, [2007] E.P.O. O.J. at 315. Claim 8 was directed to a cell culture 
of any of claims 1–7 wherein the cells were non-human primate cells; accordingly, claim 
8 was not refused as contrary to morality. Reply to Examination Report, supra note 90, at 
claim 8. However, because claim 8 depended on claims 1–7, it was unpatentable on its 
own. Id. 
 97. Case T-1374/04, [2007] E.P.O. O.J. at 340. 
 98. Id. The purpose of the Enlarged Board of Appeal is to ensure uniform application 
and to resolve important questions of European patent law. EPC 2000, supra note 20, art 
112. 
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Question 1, pertaining to the retroactivity of Rule 28, would not have 
any bearing on future ESC patent applications because these applications 
would presumably be filed after Rule 28 was already in force.99 In addi-
tion, Question 4 was quite specific to the WARF patent application, so 
the Question’s solution is unlikely to significantly affect future ESC cas-
es.100 Accordingly, this Note largely ignores Questions 1 and 4.101 
The crux of the case rested in the answers to Questions 2 and 3. The 
Technical Board noted that the main issue was whether Rule 28(c) 
should be construed narrowly or broadly.102 If construed narrowly, ac-
cording to WARF, Rule 28(c) would exclude from patentability “only 
applications whose claims were directed to the use of human embryos”; a 
broad interpretation would likely exclude patents claiming products 
“whose isolation necessitated the direct and unavoidable use of human 
embryos.”103 As a general principle, exceptions to patentability, such as 
                                                                                                             
 99. In referring Question 1 to the Enlarged Board, the Technical Board cited two 
Technical Board decisions that ostensibly answer the question. In Case T-272/95, unpub-
lished op. at 9 (Technical Bd. App. Oct. 23, 2002), available at http://legal.european-
patent-office.org/dg3/pdf/t950272eu2.pdf, the Technical Board concluded that Rules 
23b–e (now Rules 26–29) were merely interpretive of Article 53(a) and therefore went 
into force on September 1, 1999. Case T-1374/04, [2007] E.P.O. O.J. at 329. Similarly, in 
Case T-315/03, [2006] E.P.O. O.J. 15 (Technical Bd. App. 2004), the Technical Board 
held that Rule 23d (now Rule 28) applied to cases pending on September 1, 1999, be-
cause this Rule was merely interpretive of Article 53(a) and did not previously cause an 
unpredictable change in its interpretation. Case T-1374/04, [2007] E.P.O. O.J. at 330. 
Accordingly, the EPO may not grant a patent for any application that was pending on 
September 1, 1999, if the application claims an invention that concerns uses of human 
embryos for industrial or commercial purposes. Id. at 331. 
 100. First, the Enlarged Board would only need to address Question 4 if it concluded 
in response to Questions 2 or 3 that Rule 28(c) and/or Article 53(a) rendered WARF’s 
invention unpatentable. Furthermore, future ESC inventions are unlikely to necessitate 
the destruction of human embryos, but will instead rely upon available hESC lines. 
 101. Nevertheless, in discussing Question 4, the Technical Board did raise an interest-
ing issue of whether a law enforcing moral attitudes should be based on the state of pub-
lic opinion at a patent application’s priority date or based on the current state of public 
opinion. Case T-1374/04, [2007] E.P.O. O.J. at 339. On the one hand, the attitude toward 
ESC research has become more favorable since the inception of the Directive. On the 
other hand, the Technical Board decided in Case T-315/03, [2006] E.P.O. O.J. 15, that a 
“Rule 23d type” or Article 53(a) assessment should be made based on the state of affairs 
at the filing or priority date. Id. at 51–56. 
 102. Case T-1374/04, [2007] E.P.O. O.J. at 317. 
 103. Id. at 317. The Technical Board cited several of WARF’s arguments in favor of a 
narrow construction: First, Rule 28 refers to the unpatentability of certain “inventions,” 
which is arguably a reference only to the claimed subject matter, not the indirect and 
unclaimed use of human embryos. Second, Rule 28(d) explicitly specifies that the prod-
uct of “processes for modifying the genetic identity of animals” (i.e., genetically mod-
ified animals) is unpatentable, whereas Rule 28(c) clearly omits any reference to the 
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those provided in Rule 28(c) and Article 53(a), should be interpreted nar-
rowly.104 While the Enlarged Board once stated that this narrow con-
struction rule “did not apply without exception,” the Enlarged Board 
never clarified exactly what would constitute an exception to the general 
rule.105 
In the opinion, the Technical Board also reasserted the Examining Di-
vision’s position that Rule 28(c) excludes the WARF application for pa-
tentability, even under a narrow construction.106 According to the EPO, 
Directive 98/44/EC, from which Rule 28(c) was derived, was drafted 
with an aim of emphasizing that technologies using human embryos for 
an “ethically unacceptable” purpose should be barred from patenting.107 
Although Article 6(2) was amended just prior to the Directive’s adoption 
to replace the phrase “methods in which human embryos are used” with 
“uses of human embryos,”108 the Examining Division concluded that the 
incorporation of the new language was not made with the intent to allow 
patenting of products derived from such uses of human embryos.109 The 
Examining Division reasoned that the European Commission was not 
necessarily aware of the establishment of the hESC lines at the time of 
the Directive’s adoption, and therefore could not have deliberately al-
lowed patenting of inventions involving hESCs.110 
With regard to Question 3, WARF argued that the Board should apply 
a balancing test in deciding whether patent application claims violate 
                                                                                                             
product of using human embryos; therefore Rule 28(c) should not exclude the WARF 
application from patentability. Another argument supporting a narrow construction is that 
prior to its enactment, the Directive was amended to replace the phrase “methods in 
which human embryos are used” with “uses of human embryos.” As amended, the Direc-
tive’s prohibition seems to be limited to direct uses of human embryos, rather than any 
invention in which human embryos are used even indirectly. Id. at 318–19. 
 104. Id. at 332–33. 
 105. Id. (citing Case G-1/04, [2006] E.P.O. O.J. 334, 350 (Enlarged Bd. App. 2005)) 
(“It is also true that the frequently cited principle, according to which exclusion clauses 
from patentability laid down in the EPC are to be construed in a restrictive manner, does 
not apply without exception. However, the Enlarged Board of Appeal considers that the 
principle of a narrow interpretation of such exclusion clauses is to apply in respect of the 
scope of the exclusion from patentability under Article 52(4) EPC concerning diagnostic 
methods.”). 
 106. Case T-1374/04, [2007] E.P.O. O.J. at 335–36. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 319–20. 
 109. Id. at 335–38. 
 110. Although the WARF application was published in 1996, the first scientific journal 
article reporting on WARF’s discovery was not published until November 1998, after the 
Directive had already been adopted. Id. at 337. See Thomson et al., supra note 16. 
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Article 53(a).111 However, the Technical Board expressed doubts over 
the ethics of balancing the interests of patients who could potentially 
benefit from the exploitation of ESCs against the rights of human em-
bryos.112 
The Enlarged Board, recognizing the prevalent public and governmen-
tal interest in the case, invited third parties to file amici curiae with the 
court.113 The Enlarged Board received over 160 submissions from a wide 
variety of individuals, organizations, and special interest groups.114 Not-
ably, the United Kindom Intellectual Property Office (“UKIPO”) filed an 
amicus brief in strong support of WARF’s interpretation of the EPC pro-
visions.115 The United Kingdom heavily promotes hESC research and has 
arguably the most relaxed embryonic research regulations of any West-
ern nation.116 The United Kingdom adopted the language of the Directive 
into its national laws because it considered the Directive to restrict only 
the granting of patents for processing stem cells from human embryos or 
totipotent stem cells, but not from pluripotent hESCs.117 Applying a ba-
lancing test, the UKIPO reasoned that the danger of commercial exploi-
tation of pluripotent hESCs was outweighed by the “enormous potential 
of stem cell research, including embryonic stem cell research, to deliver 
new treatments for a wide range of serious diseases.”118 Consequently, 
                                                                                                             
 111. Case T-1374/04, [2007] E.P.O. O.J. at 338. 
 112. Id. (“The Board has doubts whether, when it comes to human life, it would be 
ethically acceptable to make a decision by weighing the interests of human beings who 
could potentially benefit from the exploitation of the technology against a right, if any, of 
human embryos (whether or not they can already be qualified as human beings), to get to 
life and of not being destroyed for the benefit of others. The Board will not add more on 
this matter than just voicing its doubts on the position advocated by the appellant.”). 
 113. Communication from the Enlarged Board of Appeal Concerning Case G 2/06, 
[2006] E.P.O. O.J. 393. 
 114. See Amici Curiae in EP0770125, http://www.epoline.org/portal/public/registerplus 
(search “Publication No.” for “EP0770125”; then follow “All Documents” hyperlink) 
(last visited Mar. 4, 2009). 
 115. UKIPO, Patentability of Human Embryonic Stem Cells: WARF’s European Pa-
tent Application, http://www.ipo.gov.uk/p-policy-biotech-stemcell.htm (last visisted Mar. 
4, 2009). 
 116. See CEC REPORT, supra note 32, at 11. 
 117. UKIPO, PRACTICE NOTICE ON INVENTIONS INVOLVING HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM 
CELLS (Apr. 2003), available at http://www.ipo.gov.uk/p-pn-stemcells.htm [hereinafter 
2003 PRACTICE NOTICE] (“[T]he Office is ready to grant patents for inventions involving 
such [human embryonic pluripotent stem] cells provided they satisfy the normal require-
ments for patentability.”). However, the 2003 Practice Notice was superseded in 2009 
after the Enlarged Board’s decision on the patentability of hESC lines. UKIPO, PRACTICE 
NOTICE ON INVENTIONS INVOLVING HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM CELLS (Feb. 3, 2009), available 
at http://www.ipo.gov.uk/pro-types/pro-patent/p-law/p-pn/p-pn-stemcells-20090203.htm. 
 118. 2003 PRACTICE NOTICE, supra note 117. 
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the UKIPO’s amicus brief stressed that the Examining Division’s restric-
tive interpretations of Rule 28(c) and Article 53(a) were contrary to the 
United Kingdom’s goals of encouraging investment in stem cell re-
search.119 
As a matter of universal patent law, an invention is only as broad as its 
patented claims.120 According to the UKIPO, Article 53(a) is only con-
cerned with whether exploitation of the claimed invention would be con-
trary to morality, “not with whether other acts, preparatory, ancillary or 
subsequent thereto may be morally objectionable.”121 The main invention 
claimed in WARF’s European patent application was stem cell lines 
originally derived from primate (including human) ESCs.122 Therefore, 
the United Kingdom concluded, WARF’s invention involved only a 
product of a primate embryo, not the primate blastocystic inner cell mass 
itself.123 
The UKIPO further contended that, “in order for exploitation of an in-
vention to be contrary to morality within the meaning of Art. 53(a), it 
must offend against common European standards of morality.”124 The 
specific exceptions to patentability set forth in Rule 28(c) were derived 
from the Directive, and there was a “limited consensus” among European 
States that exploitation by destruction of human embryos for industrial or 
commercial purposes was contrary to morality.125 Exceptions to patenta-
                                                                                                             
 119. Amicus Curiae Submission of the United Kingdom (Oct. 26, 2006), at 8–9 (on 
file with the EPO), available at http://www.ipo.gov.uk/warf.pdf. See also James Rander-
son, Warning for UK Stem Cell Research If US Relaxes Rules, GUARDIAN, Sep. 28, 2007, 
at 6. 
 120. See, e.g., EPC 2000, supra note 20, art. 84 (“The claims shall define the matter 
for which protection is sought.”); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 
373 (1996) (“The claim defines the scope of a patent grant.”) (internal quotations omit-
ted). 
 121. Amicus Curiae Submission of the United Kingdom, supra note 119, at 2. 
 122. Id. at 12. 
 123. Id. at 3 (“There are certain matters which are regarded across the EPC area as 
being immoral, for example the use of anti-personnel mines. Patents for anti-personnel 
mines would rightly be rejected under Art. 53(a). But there are other matters on which 
differing strands of respectable opinion exist within the EPC area. In some cases the di-
vergence of opinion will exist within each Contracting State. In other cases the opinions 
will differ between Contracting States, so that in one Contracting State something is gen-
erally regarded as immoral, whereas in other Contracting States it is generally regarded as 
being acceptable. . . . It is submitted that if exploitation of an invention would be re-
garded as moral in (at least) a major Contracting State, then a patent should not be re-
fused under Art. 53(a).”). 
 124. Id. at 10–11. 
 125. Id. at 6, 14 (“It cannot be said that it would generally be regarded as immoral to 
use the claimed stem cells. The only circumstance in which an issue arises is if the appli-
cant (or his licensee) wishes to prepare further stem cell cultures with additional proper-
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bility must be construed narrowly; the consensus cannot be extended 
beyond what was actually agreed upon by the European Community.126 
Still further, the UKIPO argued that the purpose of WARF’s use of 
human embryos was neither industrial nor commercial, but solely to 
“carry[] out precursor research activities.”127 Therefore, the UKIPO con-
cluded, the WARF patent application did not meet the specific, narrow 
exception to patentability of Rule 28(c), nor would use of WARF’s 
claimed invention be contrary to the general consensus of morality.128 
B. The Enlarged Board’s Decision 
WARF’s arguments on appeal were similar to those in the UKIPO’s 
amicus brief.129 At the June 24, 2008, oral proceedings before the En-
larged Board, WARF prefaced its arguments with the following com-
ments: 
In 1998[,] the named inventor using the methods suggested in the ap-
plication was the first to successfully isolate and culture human em-
bryonic stem cells that can grow in vitro. The provision of these is a 
major scientific breakthrough and pioneering invention opening up a 
new and very exciting field of research having great potential for prom-
ising medical therapies and other applications, and worthy of patent 
protection.130 
The basis of WARF’s main argument was that under Article 27(2) of 
TRIPs and Article 53(a) of the EPC, the EPO can only exclude an inven-
tion from patentability if the “claimed monopoly . . . embraces the use of 
an embryo for an industrial or commercial purpose.”131 The claimed mo-
                                                                                                             
ties to those of the one already prepared. This would require research using another spare 
embryo—an activity which also cannot be said to be generally regarded as immoral.”). 
 126. Thus, the UKIPO concluded: 
(1) Article 53(a) does not prevent the patenting of claims to human embryonic 
stem cells where the claimed stem cells can be made by the skilled person 
without the use or destruction of human embryos. (2) Article 53(a) does not 
prevent the patenting of claims to human embryonic stem cells where the appli-
cant or his licensee can make the claimed stem cells without the use of human 
embryos for industrial or commercial purposes.  
Id. at 14. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Reply to May 11, 2006 Communication from the Enlarged Board, T.J. Duckworth 
on behalf of WARF (Oct. 31, 2006) (on file with the EPO). 
 130. Case G-2/06, unpublished op. at 4 (Enlarged Bd. App. Nov. 25, 2008), available 
at http://legal.european-patent-office.org/dg3/pdf/g060002ex1.pdf. 
 131. Id. at 6. 
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nopoly of WARF’s application, WARF asserted, was not to the “use of 
an embryo” and not “for an industrial or commercial purpose”; rather, 
the monopoly was to the use of an ESC, which “at most . . . is a product 
[that] ultimately was derived from an embryo.”132 WARF noted that 
there was neither treaty nor common tradition among the European 
Member States banning human embryos under fourteen-days-old133 from 
being used in hESC research.134 WARF reasoned that the Directive’s 
specific prohibition on the patenting of uses of embryos should not be 
interpreted broadly to prohibit uses of anything outside of the definitional 
embryo, because otherwise the Directive would have explicitly provided 
as such.135 Furthermore, the purpose of the morality exception to paten-
tability was to prevent industrial or commercial exploitation of human 
embryos. The preparatory extraction of cells from the blastocyst for the 
purpose of starting an hESC line in no way constituted an industrial or 
commercial act.136 
The Enlarged Board disagreed, however.137 The Enlarged Board stated 
that the purpose of enacting Rule 28 was to align the EPC with Article 
6(2) of the Directive.138 Therefore, the Directive constituted a “supple-
mentary means of interpretation” of Rule 28.139 Looking at the history of 
Article 6(2) of the Directive, the Enlarged Board noted that the European 
Council’s first drafts of the Directive in 1996 did not contain specific 
prohibitions on patenting uses of human embryos.140 In 1997, it was first 
proposed that Article 6(2) should place limits on the patentability of  
human embryos by specifically excluding “methods in which human 
embryos are used.”141 The European Council amended Article 6(2) in 
February 1998, to exclude “uses of human embryos for industrial or 
commercial purposes”; this was the text officially adopted by the EU in 
the final version of the Directive in July 1998.142 
                                                                                                             
 132. Id. 
 133. According to WARF, in the medical field, an embryo is by definition an “emb-
ryo” only once it is fourteen-days-old. Id. at 22. 
 134. Id. at 6. 
 135. Id. at 6–7. 
 136. Id. 
 137. The Enlarged Board answered “yes” to Question 1, meaning Rule 28 applied 
retroactively. Id. at 17. 
 138. Id. at 20. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 21. 
 141. Id. 
 142. The Enlarged Board also rejected WARF’s argument that the European Commu-
nity funds hESC research because the European Community actually used a selective 
funding regime under which (i) the European Community chose not to seek funding for 
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The Enlarged Board then moved on to address WARF’s specific argu-
ment. First, the Enlarged Board rejected WARF’s definition of “embryo” 
as an embryo at least fourteen-days-old.143 The Enlarged Board noted 
that German law defined “embryo” as including a fertilized egg;144 and 
the U.K. HFEA defined “embryo” to encompass “an egg in the process 
of fertilisation,” after “the appearance of a two cell zygote.”145 In light of 
the purpose of Article 6(2) of the Directive and Rule 28 of the EPC “to 
protect human dignity and prevent the commercialization of embryos,” 
the Enlarged Board inferred that the legislatures left the term “embryo” 
undefined in the Directive and EPC in order to adopt the nonrestrictive 
meanings used in national laws.146 
The Enlarged Board further rejected WARF’s argument that Rule 
28(c) was only triggered if the application specifically claimed “the use 
of human embryos.”147 The Enlarged Board reasoned that Rule 28’s ex-
clusion of an “invention,” rather than a “claim,” required it to look at 
“the technical teaching of the application as a whole” to determine if 
human embryos were used.148 Because at the time of the filing, the only 
known method of acquiring hESCs required the destruction of a human 
embryo, WARF’s invention fell within Rule 28(c)’s meaning of “use of 
human embryos.”149 
Furthermore, the Enlarged Board found that WARF’s use of human 
embryos was for “industrial or commercial purposes.”150 The Enlarged 
Board reasoned that the steps involved in making an industrial or com-
mercial product (such as WARF’s ESC lines) are themselves industrial 
or commercial exploitations of the product.151 Thus, the required prelim-
inary destruction of the human embryo was “an integral and essential 
                                                                                                             
“research activities [that] destroy human embryos, including for the procurement of stem 
cells”; and (ii) “the exclusion of funding for this step of research will not prevent the 
Community funding of subsequent steps involving human embryonic stem cells.” Id. at 
22. 
 143. Id. at 22–23. 
 144. Gesetz zum Schutz von Embryonen [Embryo Protection Act], Dec. 13, 1990, BGBl. 
I at 2746, § 8, available at http://www.bmj.bund.de/files/-/1147/ESchG%20englisch.pdf. 
 145. HFEA, 1990, c. 37, § 1(1). 
 146. Case G-2/06, unpublished op. at 23 (Enlarged Bd. App. Nov. 25, 2008), available 
at http://legal.european-patent-office.org/dg3/pdf/g060002ex1.pdf. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 23–24. 
 149. Id. at 24 (“To restrict the application of Rule 28(c) . . . to what an applicant 
chooses explicitly to put in his claim would have the undesirable consequence of making 
avoidance of the patenting prohibition merely a matter of clever and skilful drafting of 
such claim.”). 
 150. Id. at 24–26. 
 151. Id. 
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part of the industrial or commercial exploitation of the claimed inven-
tion.”152 The Enlarged Board further rejected WARF’s assertion that the 
Directive’s legislative history (i.e., the change of “methods in which hu-
man embryos are used” to “uses of human embryos for industrial or 
commercial purposes”) indicated a narrowing of the scope of Rule 
28(c).153 Instead, the Enlarged Board inferred a legislative intent to diffe-
rentiate between commercially exploitative uses of human embryos (ex-
cluded from patentability) and “therapeutic or diagnostic purposes applied 
to the human embryo and useful to it” (patentable).154 
Finally, the Enlarged Board rejected any notion that its interpretation 
of Rule 28(c) rendered Rule 28(c) ultra vires to Article 53(a) of the EPC 
and Article 27(2) of TRIPs.155 WARF argued that the Enlarged Board’s 
broad construction went beyond the scope of these two Articles, which 
only permit excluding from patentability inventions that themselves are 
“against ordre public or morality.”156 However, the Enlarged Board em-
phasized, 
[i]n this context, . . . it is not the fact of the patenting itself that is con-
sidered to be against ordre public or morality, but it is the performing 
of the invention, which includes a step (the use involving its destruction 
of a human embryo) that has to be considered to contravene those con-
cepts.157 
The European patent community understood the Enlarged Board’s de-
cision to mean that claims directed to processes of obtaining stem cells 
from human embryos could not receive patent protection through the 
EPO, but supposedly could still receive protection directly through the 
national patent offices of the Member States whose laws did not exclude 
such inventions from patentability.158 On a grander scale, some experts 
believe that the Enlarged Board’s decision will bolster the stem cell re-
                                                                                                             
 152. Id. at 25. 
 153. Id. at 25–26. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 26–28. 
 156. Id. at 26 (emphasis omitted). 
 157. Id. (italics omitted). Having already answered Question 2 in the affirmative, the 
Enlarged Board declined to address Question 3 because Rule 28 (the specific exclusion) 
fell within the scope of Article 53(a) (the general exclusion). Id. at 28. See also id. at 29 
(“Thus question 4 must be answered to the effect that it is not of relevance that after the 
filing date the same products could be obtained without having to recur to a method nec-
essarily involving the destruction of human embryos.”). 
 158. James Randerson, Europe Rejects Patent Governing Use of Embryonic Stem 
Cells, GUARDIAN, Nov. 27, 2008, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2008/ 
nov/27/embryonic-stem-cells-patent. 
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search market in Europe, because European biotech companies will be 
able to conduct hESC research without having to pay costly patent li-
censing fees.159 
IV. COMPARING THE U.S. AND EUROPEAN PATENT SYSTEMS: 
RAMIFICATIONS 
The moral boundaries of hESC research are difficult to draw. Still, 
most countries allow hESC research within their borders in at least some 
limited capacity.160 However, the morality of patenting inventions based 
on derivatives of human embryos is a separate issue. The difference in 
treatment of Dr. Thomson’s invention by the USPTO and the EPO un-
derscores a divergence in policies between two of the world’s principal 
patent systems. 
In the WARF stem cell case, the Enlarged Board adopted the legisla-
ture’s determination under Rule 28(c) that industrial or commercial ex-
ploitation of WARF’s invention would be “contrary to morality.”161 By 
specifically addressing only Question 2, and not Question 3, the Enlarged 
Board did not take the opportunity to perform a cost-benefit analysis to 
ascertain the net morality of WARF’s invention.162 After all, hESCs were 
not specifically contemplated when the European Council drafted Article 
6(2) of the Directive.163 Had the EPO never adopted Rule 28(c) (i.e., 
never specifically excluded “uses of human embryos for industrial or 
commercial purposes”), it is not clear that WARF’s invention would 
have been excluded from patentability as “contrary to morality” under 
Article 53(a) alone. The EPO’s Technical Board of Appeal has per-
formed such a case-by-case morality analysis and allowed the application 
to undergo patent examination after finding that the harm the invention 
caused to animals was outweighed by the potential benefits to human 
health (as discussed below in the Oncomouse case164). A factual “morali-
ty” analysis in the WARF stem cell case would have been far more diffi-
cult than a straightforward legal determination of the scope of Rule 
28(c), especially because the morality and efficacy of hESC research is 
still hotly debated across Europe.165 
                                                                                                             
 159. Id. 
 160. See William Hoffman, Stem Cell Policy: World Stem Cell Map, http://www.mbb 
net.umn.edu/scmap.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2009). 
 161. Case G-2/06, at 27–28. 
 162. Id. at 28. 
 163. Case T-1374/04, [2007] E.P.O. O.J. 313, 337 (Technical Bd. App. 2006). 
 164. Case T-19/90, [1990] E.P.O. O.J. 476 (Technical Bd. App. 1990). 
 165. For examples of conflicting European views on the morality, therapeutic poten-
tial, and legal position of hESCs, see Amici Curiae in EP0770125, supra note 114. 
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Similarly, the United States has not reached a consensus on the morali-
ty of hESC research. Yet the USPTO would not even consider addressing 
this morality issue.166 To better understand this discrepancy, an overview 
of U.S. stem cell law and policy is necessary. 
In 1996, the U.S. Congress passed legislation (known as the “Dickey 
Amendment”), which prohibited the National Institutes of Health 
(“NIH”) from funding research (1) involving the creation of human em-
bryos for research purposes; or (2) in which human embryos are de-
stroyed.167 Congress has renewed the provisions of the Dickey Amend-
ment every year since.168 
On August 9, 2001, then-President George W. Bush announced that 
federal funds would be available only for ESC research utilizing one of 
the seventy-eight ESC lines then in existence.169 The Bush administration 
had concluded that the value of human life—even embryonic human 
life—outweighed the benefits of speeding up hESC research by deriving 
new stem cell lines from new embryos.170 
The U.S. Congress reached a different conclusion than the executive 
branch, twice passing legislation (entitled Stem Cell Research Enhance-
ment Act of 2005 and 2007, respectively) that would have eased ESC 
research funding restrictions by permitting federal funds to be allocated 
for the creation of new ESC lines derived from excess embryos that were 
created for the purpose of fertility treatments and that would otherwise 
be discarded.171 However, President Bush vetoed both bills, and issued a 
June 20, 2007 Executive Order that further enforced his August 9, 2007 
Presidential Statement.172 
                                                                                                             
 166. See generally Margo A. Bagley, Patent First, Ask Questions Later: Morality and 
Biotechnology in Patent Law, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 469 (2003). 
 167. Balanced Budget Downpayment Act, Pub. L. No. 104-99, 110 Stat. 34 (1996). 
See WHITE PAPER, supra note 46, at 1. 
 168. E.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 110-161, 121 Stat. 2209 
(2008); Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763A-71 
(2001); Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. 
L. No. 106-554, 112 Stat. 2681-386 (1999). See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, New Stem Cell 
Policy to Leave Thorniest Issue to Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2009, at A1. 
 169. As it turned out, only about twenty of these stem cell lines were viable for re-
search purposes. See Leshner & Thomson, supra note 53. For a concise, yet broad, over-
view of patenting and regulatory issues facing stem cell research in the United States, see 
Raymond R. Mandra & Alicia A. Russo, Stem Cells and Patenting and Related Regulato-
ry Issues: A United States Perspective, 7 BIO-SCI. L. REV. 143, 146 (2005). 
 170. See Editorial Desk, Downside of the Stem Cell Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2001, 
at A18. 
 171. See Zeleny, supra note 13. 
 172. Exec. Order No. 13,435, 72 Fed. Reg. 34,589 (June 22, 2007), available at 
http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2007/pdf/07-3112.pdf. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, First Bush 
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While ESC research struggled politically to gain federal support during 
the Bush-era, some states passed laws promoting ESC research.173 Addi-
tionally, President Bush’s limits on federal funding did not prevent the 
biotech sector from using private, nonfederal funds to conduct hESC re-
search.174 Still, the 2001 federal funding ban slowed the pace of hESC 
research. 
But the future for federally funded hESC research suddenly looked 
brighter during the 2008 presidential campaign. Both then-Senator Ba-
rack Obama and Senator John McCain had voted in favor of the Stem 
Cell Research Enhancement Act of 2007.175 Senator McCain’s stance 
with respect to hESC research was quite liberal compared to that of the 
Republican Party which, in August 2008, adopted a party platform of a 
“ban on the creation of or experimentation on human embryos for re-
search purposes” and “ban on all embryonic stem-cell research, public or 
private.”176 Then-Senator Obama had vowed, once elected, to reverse 
about 200 of President Bush’s executive orders and policies, including 
the limits on federally funded hESC research.177 
On March 9, 2009, newly elected President Obama followed through 
on his promise and set aside the Bush-era funding restrictions. President 
Obama’s Executive Order explicitly revoked President Bush’s August 9, 
2001 Presidential Statement and June 20, 2007 Executive Order.178 The 
                                                                                                             
Veto Maintains Limits on Stem Cell Use, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2006, at A1; Stolberg, 
supra note 41. 
 173. See Mandra & Russo, supra note 169, at 149. See also Andrew Pollack, Califor-
nia Stem Cell Research Is Upheld by Appeals Court, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2007, at A11. 
But see Monica Davey, For Missouri, Stem Cell Act Changes Little, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
10, 2007, at A12. 
 174. See Mandra & Russo, supra note 169, at 147. 
 175. U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes, 110th Congress, 1st Session, http://www.senate.gov/ 
legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=110&session=1&vote=00127 
(last visited May 16, 2009). 
 176. Larry Rohter, Back and Forth on Stem-Cell Research Energizes Race, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sep. 10, 2008, at A22; Republican National Committee, 2008 Republican Platform, 
http://www.gop.com/2008Platform/HealthCare.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2009). 
 177. Ceci Connolly & R. Jeffrey Smith, Obama Positioned to Quickly Reverse Bush 
Actions: Stem Cell, Climate Rules Among Targets of President-Elect’s Team, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 9, 2008, at A16. 
 178. Exec. Order No. 13,505, 74 Fed. Reg. 10,665 (Mar. 11, 2009), available at http://e 
docket.access.gpo.gov/2009/pdf/E9-5441.pdf. Many believed President Obama would lift 
the federal funding ban in his first week in office, stem cell scientists were left waiting 
for several weeks for President Obama to follow through on his promise. See Gardiner 
Harris & William J. Broad, Scientists Welcome Administration’s Words but Must Wait for 
Action, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2009, at A23; Carle Hulse, Democrats Weigh Methods For 
Ending Stem Cell Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2009, at A11; Jacqueline L. Salmon & Mi-
chelle Boorstein, Progressive Faith Groups Now Trying to Shift Debate: Activists Opti-
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Executive Order specifically permitted the NIH to fund “responsible, 
scientifically worthy human stem cell research, including human em-
bryonic stem cell research”; and it directed the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services to draft within 120 days new NIH guidelines and safe-
guards consistent with the decree.179 Still, the President did not seek to 
annul the Dickey Amendment; the Executive Order left up to the U.S. 
Congress the question of whether the federal government should fund 
experiments on embryos themselves.180 
Despite Europe’s adoption of Rule 28, the moral debate surrounding 
hESC research is far from settled.181 The eastern, more conservative Eu-
ropean States generally oppose hESC research funding, while the west-
ern half of Europe largely favors it.182 At one extreme, Germany prohi-
bits the procurement of hESCs, but allows importation of hESC lines for 
research purposes.183 At the opposite end of the regulatory spectrum, the 
United Kingdom permits the procurement of hESCs even from human 
embryos created solely for research purposes.184 Nearly half of the EU 
Member States have passed legislation allowing the procurement of 
hESCs from supernumerary embryos, “leftover” embryos that would 
otherwise be discarded after fertilization treatments.185 Still other Euro-
                                                                                                             
mistic That Obama Will Back Causes, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2009, at A4; Rob Stein, 
Scientists Await Action on Stem Cells: Some Proponents Had Expected Obama to Imme-
diately Reverse Bush Policies, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 2009, at A2. 
 179. Exec. Order No. 13,505, 74 Fed. Reg. 10,665. 
 180. Id. See Stolberg, supra note 167. 
 181. See Samantha Halliday, A Comparative Approach to the Regulation of Human 
Embryonic Stem Cell Research in Europe, 12 MED. L. REV. 40 (2004) (comparing the 
various hESC research regulatory schemes of Europe). 
 182. See Nicholas Watt, US Faces Science Brain Drain After Europe Backs Stem Cell 
Funding, GUARDIAN, July 25, 2006, at 17 (“But deep European divisions were exposed at 
yesterday’s ministerial meeting in Brussels. Poland, Austria, Malta, Slovakia and Lithua-
nia voted against stem cell research. They were opposed yesterday by France, Britain, the 
Netherlands, Spain and Portugal, showing that the divisions were not simply between 
Catholic and non-Catholic countries.”). 
 183. See Halliday, supra note 181, at 43. 
 184. Id. 
 185. European Consortium for Stem Cell Research, Regulations in EU Member States 
Regarding hES Cell Research (Feb. 2007), http://archive.eurostemcell.org/Documents/Out 
reach/stemcell_hesc_regulations_2007FEB.pdf [hereinafter EuroStemCell]. See also Int’l 
Consortium of Stem Cell Networks, Global Regulation of Human Embryonic Stem Cell 
Research and Oocyte Donation, http://icscn.files.wordpress.com/2008/09/global-regulation-
hesc-research-oocyte-donation-sep-08.pdf [hereinafter ICSCN]. In order to compete effec-
tively with States like the United Kingdom, in 2004 Swiss voters overwhelming approved 
a law allowing experimentation on stem cells derived from human embryos. See Luke 
Harding, Swiss Voters Back Stem Cell Research, GUARDIAN, Nov. 29, 2004, at 3. 
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pean States have not regulated ESCs at all.186 The European scientific 
community is similarly divided.187 
Yet even with the back-and-forth political debate in the United States, 
the USPTO has never rejected an ESC patent on the ground of it being 
immoral. An invention is patentable in the United States if it meets the 
requirements of utility, novelty, and nonobviousness, and is adequately 
described in the patent specification.188 While permitted by TRIPs to im-
pose a morality exception to patentability, the United States does not 
have a statute on the books that excludes “immoral” inventions from pa-
tentability. In fact, the USPTO may not make moral judgments about an 
invention disclosed in a patent application.189 As the U.S. Supreme Court 
has stated, “Congress never intended that the patent laws should displace 
the police powers of the States, meaning by that term those powers by 
which the health, good order, peace, and general welfare of the commu-
nity are promoted.”190 
In truth, the early view in the United States was that patent law’s utility 
requirement191 contained a morality element.192 In the 1817 circuit court 
case of Lowell v. Lewis, Justice Story established what came to be known 
as the “moral utility” doctrine,193 under which inventions “frivolous or 
injurious to the well-being, good policy, or sound morals of society” 
were unpatentable.194 Courts applied the moral utility doctrine for over a 
                                                                                                             
 186. EuroStemCell, supra note 185. 
 187. Survey of European Scientists on Ethics of Scientific Advancements, supra note 
63. 
 188. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–03, 112 (2007). 
 189. See Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 190. Webber v. Virginia, 103 U.S. 344, 347–48 (1880). 
 191. The utility requirement is found in 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2009) (“Whoever invents or 
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, 
or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the 
conditions and requirements of this title.”) (emphasis added). See also Diamond v. Cha-
krabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980) (“The Patent Act of 1793, authored by Thomas Jef-
ferson, defined statutory subject matter as ‘any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, 
or composition of matter, or any new or useful improvement [thereof].’”). 
 192. See 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 4.03 (2007). 
 193. See Bagley, supra note 166, at 476. 
 194. Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018 (C.C.D. Mass 1817) (“The word ‘useful,’ there-
fore, is incorporated into the act in contradistinction to mischievous or immoral. For in-
stance, a new invention to poison people, or to promote debauchery, or to facilitate private 
assassination, is not a patentable invention. But if the invention steers wide of these ob-
jections, whether it be more or less useful is a circumstance very material to the interests 
of the patentee, but of no importance to the public.”). 
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hundred years, particularly to invalidate patents on gambling devices.195 
The moral utility doctrine prevented inventions that facilitated consumer 
fraud or deception from receiving patent protection.196 
In 1980, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Diamond v. Chakrabarty that 
a genetically modified bacterium constituted patentable subject matter 
under Section 101, based on the legislative intent that patentable subject 
matter include “anything under the sun that is made by man.”197 While 
Chakrabarty is famous for paving the path for future biotech patents, by 
declaring the breadth of patentable subject matter, it essentially marked 
the death knell for the moral utility doctrine.198 In April 1987, the 
USPTO, relying on the Supreme Court’s holding in Chakrabarty, an-
nounced that it considered “nonnaturally occurring, non-human multicel-
lular living organisms, including animals, to be patentable subject mat-
ter.”199 About a year later, the USPTO issued to Harvard the first U.S. 
patent for a genetically modified animal: a transgenic mouse genetically 
engineered to carry an activated gene (specifically, an oncogene) that 
greatly increased the mouse’s susceptibility to cancer, making the mouse 
a prime specimen for cancer research and the development of cancer 
treatments (“Oncomouse”).200 
                                                                                                             
 195. E.g., Brewer v. Lichtenstein, 278 F. 512 (7th Cir. 1922); Meyer v. Buckley Mfg. 
Co., 15 F. Supp. 640 (N.D. Ill. 1936); Nat’l Automatic Device Co. v. Lloyd, 40 F. 89 
(N.D. Ill. 1889); Schultze v. Holtz, 82 F. 448 (N.D. Cal 1897). But see Chicago Patent 
Corp. v. Genco, Inc., 124 F.2d 725, 727–28 (7th Cir. 1941) (finding that a pinball ma-
chine is not inherently a gambling device). 
 196. Rickard v. Du Bon, 103 F. 868, 873 (2d Cir. 1900) (When determining that the 
claimed process for producing counterfeit tobacco leaves lacked utility, the court found 
that “[i]n authorizing patents to the authors of new and useful discoveries and inventions, 
congress did not intend to extend protection to those which confer no other benefit upon 
the public than the opportunity of profiting by deception and fraud. To warrant a patent, 
the invention must be useful; that is, capable of some beneficial use as distinguished from 
a pernicious use.”). See also Scott & Williams, Inc. v. Aristo Hosiery Co., 7 F.2d 1003 
(2d Cir. 1925) (concluding that a patent in seamless stocking designed to trick consumers 
into thinking it was of higher quality was invalid for lack of utility). 
 197. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). 
 198. See Bagley, supra note 166, at 476–77, 495 (“For many years a judicially created 
‘moral utility’ doctrine served as a type of gatekeeper of patent-eligible subject matter. . . 
The gate, however, is currently untended, as a result of judicial decisions . . . [b]eginning 
in 1980 with [Diamond v. Chakrabarty], . . . . [which] flung open the doors of the 
USPTO to biotech subject matter.”). 
 199. Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, Animals—Patentability, 1077 OFFI-
CIAL GAZ. PAT. OFF. 24 (Apr. 21, 1987). 
 200. U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (issued Apr. 12, 1988). Claim 1 provides: “A transgen-
ic non-human mammal all of whose germ cells and somatic cells contain a recombinant 
activated oncogene sequence introduced into said mammal, or an ancestor of said mam-
mal, at an embryonic stage.” Id. 
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In 1999, the Federal Circuit declared in Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange 
Bang, Inc., that although “years ago courts invalidated patents on gam-
bling devices on the ground that they were immoral[;] . . . that is no 
longer the law.”201 The court continued: 
Of course, Congress is free to declare particular types of inventions un-
patentable for a variety of reasons, including deceptiveness. Until such 
time as Congress does so, however, we find no basis in section 101 to 
hold that inventions can be ruled unpatentable for lack of utility simply 
because they have the capacity to fool some members of the public.202 
The Juicy Whip court also noted that the utility requirement was not a 
directive to the USPTO or the courts “to serve as arbiters of deceptive 
trade practices” and that there are other federal agencies, such as the 
Food and Drug Administration and Federal Trade Commission, that are 
responsible for protecting consumers from fraud and deception.203 
Over the last few decades, the U.S. legal system has limited the 
USPTO’s power of discretion to its area of expertise: patentability re-
quirements. This policy shift has taken the morality “ax” out of the hands 
of the USPTO and the courts, a shift that is in line with the fundamental 
purposes of U.S. patent law “to encourage inventions, their disclosure, 
and their commercialization.”204 Innovation in technology should be dri-
ven by investment in scientists and engineers instead of an arbitrary or 
unpredictable moral compass. “A patent is a creature of statute,”205 so 
only Congress should have the power to declare certain inventions unpa-
tentable. 
Patent law is supposed to strike a balanced bargain between the inven-
tor and the public. The public encourages industry to invest in technolo-
gical research and development with the promise of a set number of 
years of exclusive rights over commercial exploitation of the claimed 
invention. In return, the public benefits from the use of the new technol-
ogy. The new knowledge the patent brings about enables further invest-
ment in technology, which is again fueled by the incentives of the patent 
system. 
The purpose of European patent law is the same as that of U.S. patent 
law: “to promote technical innovation and the dissemination of its 
                                                                                                             
 201. Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 202. Id. at 1368 (citation omitted). 
 203. Id. See also Whistler Corp. v. Autotronics, Inc., 14 U.S.P.Q.2D 1885 (N.D. Tex. 
1988) (upholding radar detector patent); Murphy, 200 U.S.P.Q. 801 (Pat. & Trademark 
Off. Bd. App. 1977) (upholding slot machine patent). 
 204. In re Sarkar, 588 F.2d 1330, 1332 (C.C.P.A. 1978). 
 205. Arachnid, Inc. v. Merit Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 1574, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
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fruits.”206 Theoretically, inventions whose monopolized exploitation 
would promote that purpose should qualify for patent protection in both 
the United States and Europe. Yet the hESC controversy is not the first 
time that the EPO has deviated from the USPTO on the basis on morali-
ty. The USPTO granted Harvard a U.S. patent in 1988 for its Oncomouse 
invention.207 But the Oncomouse European application, filed in June 
1985, faced troubles similar to those of WARF’s European patent appli-
cation.208 On July 14, 1989, the Examining Division initially refused the 
application on the ground that the invention violated Article 53(b) of the 
EPC,209 which excludes from patentability “plant or animal varieties or 
essentially biological processes for the production of plants or ani-
mals.”210 While the United States had already affirmed the patentability 
of transgenic species in Chakrabarty,211 the EPO had never addressed the 
issue of whether Article 53(b) prohibits patents in transgenic animals.212 
On appeal, the Technical Board concluded that Article 53(b) excluded 
animal varieties, but not animals in general.213 On remand, the Examin-
ing Division granted the patent after concluding that Oncomouse did not 
constitute an animal variety,214 nor did Oncomouse violate the morality 
provision of Article 53(a).215 In reaching its conclusion on the morality 
issue, the Examining Division found that the potential benefit to humani-
ty (i.e., cancer prevention) outweighed the detriment to animals.216 Al-
                                                                                                             
 206. See EGE OPINION, supra note 14, at 6 (“The inventor gets exclusive rights to 
control commercial exploitation of his invention for some years and in return, he disclos-
es detailed description of his invention, making the new knowledge available to all. This 
disclosure enables others[, e.g.,] researchers[,] . . . to build on the achieved knowledge.”) 
(internal punctuation omitted). 
 207. U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (issued Apr. 12, 1988). 
 208. Press Release, EPO, “Oncomouse” Opposition Proceedings Resume at EPO 
(Nov. 5, 2001), http://www.epo.org/about-us/press/releases/archive/2001/05112001.html 
[hereinafter 2001 EPO Press Release]. 
 209. EPC 1973, supra note 20, art. 53(b). 
 210. See 2001 EPO Press Release, supra note 208. 
 211. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
 212. See 2001 EPO Press Release, supra note 208. 
 213. Case T-19/90, [1990] E.P.O. O.J. 476 (Technical Bd. App. 1990). 
 214. Grant of European Patent No. 0 169 672 (Onco-mouse/Harvard), [1992] E.P.O. 
O.J. 588, 590 (Examining Div. 1992). 
 215. Id. at 593. 
 216. Id. (“In the overall balance the Examining Division concludes that the present 
invention cannot be considered immoral or contrary to public order. The provision of a 
type of test animal useful in cancer research and giving rise to a reduction in the amount 
of testing on animals together with a low risk connected with the handling of the animals 
by qualified staff can generally be regarded as beneficial to mankind. A patent should 
therefore not be denied for the present invention on the grounds of Article 53(a) EPC.”). 
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though the EPO eventually granted the Oncomouse patent,217 the case 
exemplifies the uncertain status of a patent system with an ambiguous 
morality exception to patentability. 
The problem with excluding hESC inventions is that the benefits of 
stem cell research are hugely in the public interest.218 Innovation in 
hESC, as evidenced by the global research effort, is a reward for which 
the public should be willing to pay handsomely. Rejecting an invention 
for being “against morality” unjustifiably shifts the balance of the patent 
system by eliminating the inventor’s most valuable incentive, exclusive 
rights, while simultaneously expropriating for public use the new know-
ledge disclosed in the patent. This shift in balance upsets the equilibrium 
of the patent system and is an impediment to innovation. 
Morality itself is a public interest factor. If a patent office is required to 
factor morality into the patentability equation, it should consider morality 
in light of all other public interest factors, especially human health bene-
fits. Whereas morality is largely a subjective category, subject to sub-
stantial public deviation and change over time, human health benefits are 
objectively and universally in the public interest. While some may op-
pose the use of such a cost-benefit analysis because it involves putting a 
price on human life, these kinds of valuations are done all the time. 
Courts award damages in wrongful death suits. People purchase health 
and life insurance policies. Actuaries assess the costs and risks of death. 
The scientific community has demonstrated a significant reason to pur-
sue hESC technology. Despite the moral haziness presented by hESCs, 
most countries allow hESC research to some extent.219 The scientific 
promise and potential health benefits of hESC research cannot be ig-
nored. The world is craving a breakthrough in hESC technology. The 
patent system should not stand in the way. 
CONCLUSION: SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE PRACTICES 
The Directive was originally adopted in order to establish “legal cer-
tainty” among the Member States in the area of biotechnological innova-
tion.220 Theoretically, this legal certainty was supposed to make Europe a 
better landscape for attracting investment in biotechnology.221 But not all 
the Member States can agree on what constitutes an “immoral” inven-
tion.222 
                                                                                                             
 217. European Patent No. EP 0169672 (published May 13, 1992). 
 218. See NIH, supra note 42. 
 219. ICSCN, supra note 185. See generally Hoffman, supra note 139. 
 220. See EGE OPINION, supra note 14, at 6. 
 221. Id. 
 222. See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Submission of the United Kingdom, supra note 119. 
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The EPO has a few alternatives to its current practice of blackballing 
“immoral” inventions. As a first alternative, the EPO could still resolve 
whether an invention is contrary to morality, but—instead of refusing to 
examine the application—the EPO could “yellow-flag” it for having a 
“contrary-to-morality” status and continue with standard examination 
procedures. The EPO could then notify the national ethics committee of 
each Member State so that each could make a determination of patenta-
bility based solely on domestic norms. After each national ethics com-
mittee notified the EPO of its conclusion, the EPO could advise the ap-
plicant which States refused to grant patent protection. The applicant 
could then make an informed decision whether to proceed further with 
examination, while simultaneously avoiding the lengthy delays and 
heavy costs associated with appealing a decision of the Examining Divi-
sion. 
The EPO could supplement the yellow-flag system by requiring appli-
cants of yellow-flagged applications to post a significant bond in order to 
keep the application in examination. If the applicant posted the bond and 
the application was green-lighted by a certain proportion of Member 
States, the EPO would return the bond to the applicant. If too many 
Member States found the invention to be “contrary to morality,” the ap-
plicant would forfeit the bond. The bond system would avoid an influx of 
applications that disclose clearly “immoral” subject matter, or at least 
compensate the EPO for wasting its time on meritless cases. 
Europe also has the option of granting a reduced patent term to inven-
tions deemed to be morally reprehensible, instead of refusing to examine 
the application.223 Although this alternative would not satisfy people who 
believe that granting property rights in “immoral” inventions is never 
permissible,224 it would constitute a fair compromise on the difficult is-
sue and still promote the purposes of patent law. The EPC could also 
establish statutory licensing fees for patents for immoral inventions; this 
would minimize the ethical costs of the commercial exploitation of the 
“immoral” invention by limiting the economic power of the patentee’s 
exclusive rights. 
Another alternative is to repeal Article 53(a), but preserve Rule 28. 
The adoption of Rule 28 has arguably rendered Article 53(a) obsolete. 
Rule 28 is a declaration of a consensus among the Member States of 
what specifically constitutes an invention unpatentable for being contrary 
                                                                                                             
 223. EPC 2000, supra note 20, art. 63(1) provides: “The term of the European patent 
shall be [twenty] years as from the date of filing of the application.” Id. 
 224. See, e.g., Ronald L. Conte Jr., Against Embryonic Stem, CATHOLIC PLANET, Dec. 
2, 2004, http://www.catholicplanet.com/articles/article95.htm. 
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to ordre public or morality. The Enlarged Board in the WARF stem cell 
case found it unnecessary to address Article 53(a) after concluding 
WARF’s invention was unpatentable under the specific exclusion of 
Rule 28(c).225 The Enlarged Board found that the legislature had prede-
termined that the invention was contrary to morality.226 This is essential-
ly how the U.S. system works; any invention meeting all the Title 35 pa-
tentability requirements is patentable in the United States227 unless it is 
specifically excluded by statute. For example, Congress explicitly used 
its powers to promote public health and welfare to exclude the patenting 
of nuclear weapons.228 
A judicial finding of “contrary to morality” under Article 53(a) would 
require the EPO to make a much broader determination than under any of 
the specific, legislatively mandated exceptions to patentability under 
Rules 28 and 29(1).229 If an invention does not explicitly fall within one 
of the unpatentable categories elucidated in Rules 28 or 29(1), an estab-
lished European social norm that the invention’s exploitation is immoral 
likely does not exist. Otherwise, the legislature would have explicitly 
guarded against such a patent. Instead of relying on Article 53(a) as a 
backstop to Rule 28, the legislature could build upon Rule 28 to include 
any other categories of invention whose exploitation is commonly 
deemed immoral across Europe. In order to prevent the patenting of 
breakthrough technology that falls outside of the explicitly prohibited 
categories but whose exploitation would be contrary to morality, the leg-
islature would have to keep up with the latest advances in science and 
technology, especially those relating to human health. 
It is surprising that Europe has decided to burden its patent office with 
understanding categories and degrees of morality, rather than leaving the 
EPO to exercise its expertise in determining novelty, industrial applica-
bility, and inventive step.230 Morality has no place as a tool in the hands 
of a patent office,231 especially a regional patent office such as the EPO, 
which controls whether the various national patent offices of Europe 
even lay eyes on an application. While it might feel good to prohibit pa-
                                                                                                             
 225. Case G-2/06, unpublished op. at 28 (Enlarged Bd. App. Nov. 25, 2008), available 
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1080 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 34:3 
tents for inventions in morally dubious areas of science, in the end, mo-
rality restrictions on patentability only slow the pace of technology and 
frustrate the purposes and effectiveness of patent law. 
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